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813 
DETERRING TRANSFER PRICING ABUSE: 
CHANGING INCENTIVES AS A PRACTICAL 
ALTERNATIVE TO A GLOBAL TAX REGIME 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent tax scandals have involved individuals hiding money in off-
shore accounts, hopefully never to be discovered by the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”). This conduct is clearly illegal. Multinational 
businesses, however, have been avoiding taxes by moving money 
internationally for decades. The difference between a company’s tax 
avoidance procedures and illegal tax evasion is that these multinational 
businesses have become very adept at remaining within the letter of the 
law in various nations when shifting income. 
Transfer pricing is a practice whereby companies use transactions 
between different corporate units to shift income between jurisdictions for 
the purpose of reducing the company’s overall tax burden.1 An 
international company can theoretically choose to pay income taxes in the 
country of its choice by shifting income from one unit of the company 
located in a country with a relatively high corporate income tax rate to 
another unit located elsewhere with a lower tax rate. As might be 
expected, the “high tax” countries are not content to stand idly by as their 
tax base erodes out from underneath their feet. The United States, as one 
of the relatively higher-tax countries, has enacted a variety of laws and 
regulations to try to ensure that international companies accurately 
apportion their income among the countries where they conduct business.
2
 
 
 
 1. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1309 (9th ed. 2009). The following is an example of how a 
transfer pricing scheme might work: 
[A] company . . . that makes widgets [creates] a subsidiary, S1, to perform the actual 
manufacturing in high-tax country A. The widgets cost $60 to produce. S1 sells the widgets 
for $62 to a related company, S2, which is a resident in tax haven Country B. S2 sells the 
widgets for $80 to S3, yet another related company residing in the United States. S3 
distributes the widgets throughout the U.S. market, selling them to unrelated U.S. customers 
at an average of $90, after incurring expenses of about $5 per widget. Of the $25 of combined 
profits per widget, S1 reports and pays taxes on $2 in A. S3 pays taxes on its profit of $ 5 per 
widget in the United States. S2 reports $18 of the profit and is taxable only in B, which levies 
very little tax. 
Julie Roin, Can The Income Tax Be Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of Adopting World-Wide 
Formulary Apportionment, 61 TAX L. REV. 169, 181 (2008). 
 2. The beginning of this long maze of rules can be found at I.R.C. § 482 (2006), which provides 
the overarching goal of preventing tax evasion through accurately apportioning income between 
entities that conduct transactions with each other. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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While the intended legal framework for transfer pricing is not difficult 
to define in broad strokes, the actual detailed implementation of the 
necessary laws and regulations in each nation has proven to be 
extraordinarily difficult. With billions of dollars at stake, international 
businesses have a huge financial incentive to find ways to reduce their tax 
burden while still staying within the letter of various nations’ laws.  
This Note proposes a change to the jurisdiction of the U.S. Tax Court 
and discusses why such a change would deter businesses from engaging in 
overly aggressive tax-avoidance behavior. First, in Part II it provides an 
initial example of the problem of transfer pricing by explaining how a 
multinational enterprise, IKEA, uses a carefully planned corporate 
structure to greatly reduce its tax burden. It then provides an introduction 
to how one nation, the United States, addresses corporations that shift 
income between countries. Next, it addresses in Part III how the global tax 
system might be reformed and whether such reform would effectively 
prevent tax evasion by allocating income to countries with a lower tax. In 
Part IV, using the U.S. tax regime as an example, the Note suggests 
modifications to national tax regimes that will deter transfer pricing 
abuses, including the requirement that Article III courts, where there is the 
prospect of a jury as the fact-finder, have exclusive jurisdiction over 
transfer pricing disputes. The Note concludes in Part V. 
II. TRANSFER PRICING PERMITS INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES  
TO AVOID TAXES 
The concept of an “international tax system” is an illusion. The current 
reality is one of independent states attempting to tax international 
activities by casting a net woven from a mixture of each country’s 
domestic tax laws and bilateral tax treaties.
3
 Not surprisingly, the lack of a 
 
 
 3. “Basically, there are three sets of international tax rules: (1) the domestic rules dealing with 
taxation of non-residents, (2) the domestic rules dealing with taxation of residents generating income 
abroad, and (3) some complementary rules (that are not purely domestic and are mainly found in tax 
treaties) . . . .” Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 259, 
265–66 (2003). An international income tax system usually contains:  
several layers of rules that apply to transactions and taxpayers independent of each other, but 
in a certain, rigid order. These sets of rules, in that order, are: (1) definition of “income” 
subject to tax, (2) measurement of the tax base and transfer pricing rules, (3) classification of 
types of income, (4) source (and allocation) rules, (5) taxing provisions, including rates and 
timing, (6) relief of domestic taxation under domestic rules, (7) relief of domestic taxation 
claiming tax treaty benefits, and (8) means of collection—mainly withholding tax rules. 
Id. The system is currently made up of about 1,500 bilateral tax treaties. Id. at 292. Although the sheer 
number of treaties may lead one to believe otherwise, there is already a degree of harmonization 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss4/6
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uniform system can lead to problems in taxing international entities as 
nations originally intended under their current “international” tax systems. 
The possibility of over or under taxation affects businesses’ incentives, 
which in turn affects their decision-making processes and often leads to 
losses in economic efficiency.
4
 One tax avoidance practice used by 
multinational businesses is transfer pricing.  
Of course, many countries, including the United States, have adopted 
rules to try to prevent abusive transfer pricing.
5
 Some of the tax law 
unrelated to transfer pricing can reduce the impact of the tax avoidance 
rules, such as the taxpayer’s choice of court in the United States. Even the 
most comprehensive national regulations, however, permit international 
businesses, like IKEA, to take advantage of gaps in tax regimes because 
transfer pricing is a uniquely international—not national—tax issue. 
A. An Example of Transfer Pricing and Tax Avoidance: IKEA 
IKEA is a large multinational retailer that specializes in relatively 
inexpensive home furnishings.
6
 Even though it is a worldwide retailer, the 
IKEA group is not organized as a corporation, but rather as a Dutch 
charitable non-profit organization.
7
 Although this charity, the Stichting 
Ingka Foundation,
8
 applies only a small fraction of its wealth to its stated 
purpose,
9
 it does allow the IKEA group to keep much of what it earns in a 
 
 
among these treaties. See, e.g., id. at 271 (noting harmony in various jurisdictions’ definition of 
income tax base). But see id. at 284 (“[H]armonization of the tax rates is . . . impractical . . . .”). 
 4. See id. at 291. In addition, a government’s inability to collect revenue as intended from 
international businesses also leads to equity issues for wholly domestic entities. Diane Ring, 
Democracy, Sovereignty and Tax Competition: The Role of Tax Sovereignty in Shaping Tax 
Cooperation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 555, 576 (2009). If the government cannot collect revenue from the 
international businesses, it is forced “to either reduce [its] services and benefits, or alternatively, 
increase taxes on a less mobile base—typically employment and consumption.” Id. “Either option 
potentially levies an increased burden on a subset of society . . . .”). 
 5. Brauner, supra note 3, at 274. 
 6. IKEA states that its business concept is “[t]o offer a wide range of well designed, functional 
home furnishing products at prices so low that as many people as possible will be able to afford them.” 
Facts & Figures Yearly Summary, IKEA 6 (2011), http://www.ikea.com/ms/en_CA/pdf/yearly 
summary/welcome_inside_2011.pdf. 
 7. IKEA: Flat-pack Accounting, THE ECONOMIST, May 13, 2006, at 69, 69. “Stichtingen, or 
foundations, are the most common form of not-for-profit organisation in the Netherlands; tens of 
thousands of them are registered. Most Dutch stichtingen are tiny . . . .” Id. 
 8. The foundation likely gets its name from a contraction of the name of IKEA’s founder, 
Ingvar Kamprad. In 2006, The Economist estimated that it was worth $36 billion. Id. 
 9. The Stichting Ingka Foundation is “dedicated to ‘innovation in the field of architectural and 
interior design.’ [sic] The articles of association . . . state that this object cannot be amended. Even a 
Dutch court can make only minor changes to the stichting’s aims.” Id. 
Under its articles, Stichting Ingka Foundation channels its funds to Stichting IKEA 
Foundation, another Dutch-registered foundation with identical aims, and which actually 
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tax-exempt entity.
10
 The Stichting Ingka Foundation owns a private Dutch 
company, Ingka Holding,
11
 which in turn is the parent of almost every 
other IKEA company.
12
  
Furthermore, separate from this group of companies, another private 
Dutch company, Inter IKEA Systems, owns the IKEA trademark and 
concept.
13
 Each IKEA store pays three percent of its sales to this company 
as a royalty for the use of IKEA’s intellectual property.14 The royalties 
paid to Inter IKEA Systems are transferred through a chain of similarly 
named companies and eventually end up being administered by a trust 
company in Curaçao, an island in the Dutch Caribbean, which refuses to 
name the beneficiaries of the trust.
15
 At the end of this chain of 
transactions, the unnamed beneficiaries have access to the proceeds from 
the intellectual property royalties.
16
 Thus, the three percent of sales from 
each store that would likely otherwise have been taxable income do not 
end up taxed in the country where IKEA furniture was actually bought and 
sold.  
The practice of a company shifting income by charging itself for the 
use of its own intellectual property is certainly not limited to IKEA.
17
 Yet, 
 
 
doles out money for worthy interior-design ideas. But the second foundation does not publish 
any information either. . . . IKEA says only that this money is used for charitable purposes 
and “for investing long-term in order to build a reserve for securing the IKEA group, in case 
of any future capital requirements.” IKEA adds that in the past two years donations have been 
concentrated on the Lund Institute of Technology in Sweden. The Lund Institute say it has 
recently received SKr12.5m ($1.7m) a year from Stichting IKEA (which also gave the 
institute a lump sum of SKr55m in the late 1990s). That is barely a rounding error in the 
foundation’s assets. 
Id. at 70. 
 10. Id. at 69. 
 11. Ingka Holding is a private Dutch company. Id. at 69. It owns many of the 287 IKEA stores 
directly, while the remaining stores are owned by franchisees. Facts & Figures, supra note 6, at 22. 
 12. IKEA: Flat-pack Accounting, supra note 7, at 69. For a graphical example of IKEA’s 
structure, see Ikea’s Duthch [sic] Trick, http://www.altreconomia.it/allegati/contenuti/phpmqcMPA 
5076.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). 
 13. IKEA: Flat-pack Accounting, supra note 7, at 70. 
 14. “Inter IKEA earns its money from the franchise agreements it has with each IKEA store. 
These are extremely lucrative: IKEA says that all franchisees pay 3% of sales.” Id. 
 15. Inter IKEA Systems’ “parent company is Inter IKEA Holding, registered in Luxembourg. 
This, in turn, belongs to an identically named company in the Netherlands Antilles, run by a trust 
company in Curaçao. Although the beneficial owners remain hidden from view . . . they are almost 
certain to be members of the Kamprad family.” Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. For example, in 2006, GlaxoSmithKline PLC, a British company settled a transfer pricing 
dispute with the IRS for $3.4 billion: 
The case . . . involved the way Glaxo paid taxes on U.S. profits from such popular drugs as 
Zantac, a stomach remedy, Imitrex, for treatment of migraines, and Ceftin, an antibiotic. At 
issue was one of the thorniest concerns facing tax collectors—how multinational corporations 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss4/6
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IKEA’s system might be considered a more aggressive use of this 
practice.
18
 To understand how such tax-avoiding transactions are allowed, 
one must have a basic grasp of the international tax system.  
B. An Example of a National Transfer Pricing Regime: The United States 
The United States is a common law jurisdiction that utilizes statutes 
and regulations to state the tax rules. Taxpayers may challenge tax rules 
applied to them in court. Courts will decide the legality of the taxpayer’s 
position in accordance with the statutes and regulations. Currently, in the 
United States, strategic tax planning includes choosing which court hears 
the case. 
1. U.S. Statutes and Regulations 
The statute governing transfer pricing is found in § 482 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, which gives the IRS the authority to “distribute, apportion, 
or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances . . . if [it] 
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary 
in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly . . . reflect . . . [the 
taxpayer’s] income . . . .”19 In 1986, thirty-two years after enacting 
 
 
apportion profits and expenses among units in different countries. The IRS has said that 
companies often manipulate cross-border transactions to minimize taxes.  
. . . .  
The IRS had alleged that [GlaxoSmithKline] had allotted too little of its profits from 
worldwide drug sales to its U.S. subsidiary. Determining the proper split in what are known 
as “transfer pricing” cases can involve apportioning such intangible items as the value of 
trademarks and brand names. 
David S. Hilzenrath, Glaxo to Pay IRS $3.4 Billion, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2006, at D1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/11/AR2006091100429.html. 
 18. Even with the examples such as GlaxoSmithKline, supra note 17, companies are still shifting 
income to a lower-tax country. IKEA not only shifts its income, but then through a series of 
subsequent transactions, it ends up paying only about 3.5% in taxes. See IKEA: Flat-pack Accounting, 
supra note 7, at 70. 
 19. I.R.C. § 482 (2006). The full statute provides: 
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated, 
whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, 
or allocate gross income, deductions, credits or allowances between or among such 
organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or 
allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of 
any of such organizations, trades, or businesses. In the case of any transfer (or license) of 
intangible property (within the meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to 
such transfer or license shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible. 
Id. 
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§ 482,
20
 the U.S. Congress recognized that transfer pricing issues 
involving intangible property, like trademarks, were especially 
problematic.
21
 Congress added a provision that “the income with respect to 
[the transfer or licensing of intangible property] shall be commensurate 
with the income attributable to the intangible.”22 
 
 
 20. Section 482 was first enacted in 1954. Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3 (codified as amended 
at I.R.C. § 482 (2006)). 
 21. The legislative history of § 482’s second sentence makes clear that Congress recognized the 
uniquely difficult problem presented by intangible property. H.R. REP. NO. 99-426 (1985), reprinted 
in 5 TAX REFORM 1986: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 423. In a 
section entitled “Reasons for Change,” Congress noted: 
There is a strong incentive for taxpayers to transfer intangibles to related foreign corporations 
in a low tax jurisdiction, particularly when the intangible has a high value relative to 
manufacturing or assembly costs. Such transfers can result in indefinite tax deferral or 
effective tax exemption on the earnings, while retaining the value of the earnings in the 
related group. The committee is concerned that the provisions of sections 482, 367(d), and 
936 that allocate income to a U.S. transferor of intangibles may not be operating to assure 
adequate allocations to the U.S. taxable entity of income attributable to intangibles in these 
situations. 
Id. Regarding § 482 specifically, the House Ways and Means Committee added: 
Many observers have questioned the effectiveness of the “arm’s length” approach of the 
regulations . . . . A recurrent problem is the absence of comparable arm’s length transactions 
between unrelated parties, and the inconsistent results of attempting to impose an arm’s 
length concept in the absence of comparables. A fundamental problem is the fact that the 
relationship between related parties is different from that of unrelated parties. Observers have 
noted that multinational companies operate as an economic unit, and not “as if” they were 
unrelated to their foreign subsidiaries . . . . The problems are particularly acute in the case of 
transfers of high-profit potential intangibles. Taxpayers may transfer such intangibles to 
foreign related corporations or to possession corporations at an early stage, for a relatively 
low royalty, and take the position that it was not possible at the time of the transfers to predict 
the subsequent success of the product. Even in the case of a proven high-profit intangible, 
taxpayers frequently take the position that intercompany royalty rates may appropriately be 
set on the basis of industry norms for transfers of much less profitable items. 
Id. at 423–24 (citations omitted). To attempt to address the problem, the “commensurate with income” 
standard was added to § 482. See id. at 425. The Ways and Means Committee explained the logic 
behind the change: 
Transfers between related parties do not involve the same risks as transfers to unrelated 
parties. There is thus a powerful incentive to establish a relatively low royalty without 
adequate provisions for adjustment as the revenues of the intangible vary. There are extreme 
difficulties in determining whether the arm’s length transfers between unrelated parties are 
comparable. The committee thus concludes that it is appropriate to require that the payment 
made on a transfer of intangibles to a related foreign corporations or possessions corporations 
be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible. . . . The committee believes, 
therefore, that this is the measure that should be used under . . . section 482 in the case of 
transfers to a foreign corporation. 
Id. at 425. 
 22. I.R.C. § 482 (2006). Section 482 is only two sentences long. Congress added the second 
sentence pertaining to intangible property in 1986, thirty years after the first sentence. Tax Reform Act 
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2562 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 482 (2006)). Like the 
first sentence, the second sentence basically leaves it to the IRS to implement a workable solution: 
“[i]n the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property (within the meaning of section 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss4/6
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The U.S. Department of Treasury regulations interpreting § 482 state 
that its purpose “is to ensure that taxpayers clearly reflect income 
attributable to controlled transactions and to prevent the avoidance of taxes 
with respect to such transactions.”23 In general terms, a “controlled 
transaction” simply refers to a transaction between two parties that are 
both under the same entity’s control.24 This purpose is accomplished by 
ensuring “tax parity,” meaning comparable tax treatment, between a 
taxpayer who is part of a controlled transaction and one who is not.
25
 The 
key to achieving parity between the two is to “determin[e] the true taxable 
income of the controlled taxpayer”26 and reallocate income “between or 
among the members of a controlled group if [the] controlled taxpayer has 
not reported its true taxable income.”27  
 
 
936(h)(3)(b)), the income with respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate with the 
income attributable to the intangible.” Id. The cross-referenced section states: 
The term ‘intangible property’ means any—(i) patent, invention, formula, process, design, 
pattern, or know-how; (ii) copyright, literary, musical, or artistic composition; (iii) trademark, 
trade name, or brand name; (iv) franchise, license, or contract; (v) method, program, system, 
procedure, campaign, survey, study, forecast, estimate, customer list, or technical data; or (vi) 
any similar item, which has substantial value independent of the services of any individual. 
I.R.C. § 936(h)(3)(b) (2006). 
 23. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T (2009). 
 24. The actual definition given by the Treasury, which is much more detailed, is available at 
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i) (2009). A controlled transaction is a “transaction or transfer between two or 
more members of the same group of controlled taxpayers.” Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(8) (2009). “Group, 
controlled group, and group of controlled taxpayers mean the taxpayers owned or controlled directly or 
indirectly by the same interests.” Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(6) (2009) (emphasis omitted). A controlled 
taxpayer is “any one of two or more taxpayer owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same 
interests, and includes the taxpayer that owns or controls the other taxpayers.” Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
1(i)(5) (2009). The definition of “control” ensures to cast a wide net. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(4) 
(2009). Control is broadly defined as “any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether legally 
enforceable or not . . . including control resulting from the actions of two or more taxpayers acting in 
concert or with a common goal or purpose.” Id. Ensuring that creative lawyers cannot use form to 
defeat substance, the definition further states “[i]t is the reality of the control that is decisive, not its 
form or the mode of its exercise. A presumption of control arises if income or deductions have been 
arbitrarily shifted.” Id. Covering all the bases, a taxpayer is defined as “any person, organization, trade 
or business, whether or not subject to any internal revenue tax.” Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(3) (2009). 
The term “[o]rganization includes an organization of any kind . . . irrespective or the place of 
organization, operation, or conduct of the trade or business . . . .” Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(1) (2009). 
Lastly, a “[t]rade or business includes a trade or business activity of any kind, regardless of whether or 
where organized . . . and regardless of the place of operation.” Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(2) (2009).  
 25. 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1T (a)(1) (2009). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(2) (2009). “In such case, the district director may allocate income, 
deductions, credits, allowances, basis, or any other item or element affecting taxable income . . . . The 
appropriate allocation may take the form of an increase or decrease in any relevant amount.” Id. 
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The IRS’s standard to determine a controlled taxpayer’s true taxable 
income is the “arm’s length standard.”28 The arm’s length standard is 
based on the principle that income reported by related parties involved in a 
transaction should be the same as independent parties who engage in the 
same transaction under the same circumstances.” 29 Since it is nearly 
impossible to recreate the exact same situation twice, however, “whether a 
transaction produces an arm’s length result . . . [is] determined by 
reference to the results of comparable transactions under comparable 
circumstances.”30 Treasury regulations specify a variety of detailed 
methods for determining what is “comparable”31 and require the use of the 
 
 
 28. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (2009) (“In determining the true taxable income of a controlled 
taxpayer, the standard to be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with an 
uncontrolled taxpayer. A controlled transaction meets the arm’s length standard if the results of the 
transaction are consistent with the results that would have been realized if uncontrolled taxpayers 
engaged in the same transaction under the same circumstances . . . .”). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. For cases like IKEA and GlaxoSmithKline, supra note 17, where the internal transfer 
involves intangible property, the Treasury provides four methods to choose from. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
4(a) (2009). The first is the “comparable uncontrolled transaction method[, which] evaluates whether 
the amount charged for a controlled transfer of intangible property was arm’s length by reference to 
the amount charged in a comparable uncontrolled transaction.” Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(c) (2009). The 
second is the “comparable profits method[, which] evaluates whether the amount charged in a 
controlled transaction is arm’s length based on objective measures of profitability (profit level 
indicators) derived from uncontrolled taxpayers that engage in similar business activities under similar 
circumstances.” Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(a) (2009).  
Under the comparable profits method, the determination of an arm’s length result is based on 
the amount of operating profit that the tested party would have earned on related party 
transactions if its profit level indicator were equal to that of an uncontrolled comparable 
(comparable operating profit). Comparable operating profit is calculated by determining a 
profit level indicator for an uncontrolled comparable, and applying the profit level indicator to 
the financial data related to the tested party’s most narrowly identifiable business activity for 
which data incorporating the controlled transaction is available (relevant business 
activity). . . . The tested party’s reported operating profit is compared to the comparable 
operating profits derived from the profit level indicators of uncontrolled companies to 
determine whether the reported operating profit represents an arm’s length result. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(b)(1) (2009). Third: 
The profit split method evaluates whether the allocation of the combined operating profit or 
loss attributable to one or more controlled transactions is arm’s length by reference to the 
relative value of each controlled taxpayer’s contribution to that combined operating profit or 
loss. The combined operating profit or loss must be derived from the most narrowly 
identifiable business activity of the controlled taxpayers for which data is available that 
includes the controlled transactions (relevant business activity). 
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(a) (2009). Finally, a taxpayer is given the nebulous guidance that “[m]ethods not 
specified in . . . this section may be used to evaluate whether the amount charged in a controlled 
transaction is arm’s length.” Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(d)(1) (2009). This “catch-all” provision states: 
Consistent with the specified methods, an unspecified method should take into account the 
general principle that uncontrolled taxpayers evaluate the terms of a transaction by 
considering the realistic alternatives to that transaction, and only enter into a particular 
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test that “provides the most reliable measure of an arm’s length result.”32 
The simple instruction that companies pick “the most reliable measure” 
provides one straightforward and lawful opportunity for companies to take 
advantage of the inexact nature of the arm’s length standard by using the 
method that permits the most tax avoidance. Moreover, the law’s choice of 
forum permits companies to gain an advantage by choosing a forum with 
the most favorable ground rules for them.  
2. U.S. Courts and Choice of Forum 
In the United States, the structure of the court system itself plays a 
significant role in the functioning of the tax system. When the IRS 
determines that a taxpayer has under-allocated its income attributable to 
the United States, the taxpayer has three options to contest that 
determination.
33
 In theory, the taxpayer chooses among the U.S. Tax 
Court, the Federal Claims Court, or a federal district court.
34
 In practice, 
however, the tax system heavily incentivizes taxpayers to choose the 
United States Tax Court because it is the only method by which a taxpayer 
 
 
transaction if none of the alternatives is preferable to it. . . . [I]n establishing whether a 
controlled transaction achieved an arm’s length result, an unspecified method should provide 
information on the prices or profits that the controlled taxpayer could have realized by 
choosing a realistic alternative to the controlled transaction. 
Id. 
 32. This test is referred to as the “best method rule.” Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(1) (2009).  
The arm’s length result of a controlled transaction must be determined under the method that, 
under the facts and circumstances, provides the most reliable measure of an arm’s length 
result. Thus, there is no strict priority of methods, and no method will invariably be 
considered to be more reliable than others. An arm’s length result may be determined under 
any method without establishing the inapplicability of another method, but if another method 
subsequently is shown to produce a more reliable measure of an arm’s length result, such 
other method must be used. Similarly, if two or more applications of a single method provide 
inconsistent results, the arm’s length result must be determined under the application that, 
under the facts and circumstances, provides the most reliable measure of an arm’s length 
result. 
Id. Applying this to the four standards provided for transactions involving intangible property could be 
especially difficult considering the possibility that the “best method” a taxpayer should have used was 
an “unspecified method.” See id. 
 33. Congress set the baseline by providing: 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Claims 
Court, of . . . [a]ny civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-
revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty 
claimed to have been collected with authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in 
any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws . . . . 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2006). See also 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. 
COOPER & VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4102 (3d ed. 2009).  
 34. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2006). 
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does not have to pay the contested tax up front.
35
 Once the taxpayer elects 
to go before the Tax Court, a court created by Congress under Article I of 
the U.S. Constitution (“Article I court”), the taxpayer loses the option of 
later going before a federal district court, a court created by Congress 
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution (“Article III court”).36 
Congress created the Tax Court in its current form as an Article I court 
as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
37
 The Tax Court has nineteen 
 
 
 35. I.R.C. § 7422 (2006). The statute gives the general rule: 
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal 
revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any 
penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been 
excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been 
duly filed . . . . 
I.R.C. § 7422(a) (2006). The statute then carves out an exception to the general prepayment rule:  
If the [IRS] prior to the hearing of a suit brought by a taxpayer in a district court or the United 
States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of any income tax . . . (or any penalty relating 
to such taxes) mails to the taxpayer a notice that a deficiency has been determined in respect 
of the tax which is the subject matter of the taxpayer’s suit, the proceedings in taxpayer’s suit 
shall be stayed during the period of time in which the taxpayer may file a petition with the 
Tax Court for a redetermination of the asserted deficiency, and for 60 days thereafter.  
I.R.C. § 7422(e) (2006). In Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 75–76 (1958), the Supreme Court 
recognized: 
[w]here the time to petition [the tax] court has expired, or where for some other reason a suit 
in the District Court seems more desirable, the requirement of full payment may in some 
instances work a hardship . . . . [A]ny hardship would grow out of an opinion whose effect 
Congress in successive statutory revisions has made no attempt to alter . . . . 
 36. Section 7422 of the tax code divests the non-chosen courts of jurisdiction by providing: 
 If the taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court, the district court or the United States 
Court of Federal Claims, as the case may be, shall lose jurisdiction of taxpayer’s suit to 
whatever extent jurisdiction is acquired by the Tax Court of the subject matter of taxpayer’s 
suit for refund.  
I.R.C. § 7422(e). See also Flora, 357 U.S. at 75 (1958) (“[T]he legislative history of 28 U.S.C. 
1346(a)(1) and related statutes leaves no room for contention that their broad terms were intended in 
any way to alter the . . . principle of ‘pay first and litigate later.’ . . . To ameliorate the hardship 
produced by these requirements Congress created a special court where tax questions could be 
adjudicated in advance of any payment.”); Kaffenberger v. United States, 314 F.3d 944, 958 (8th Cir. 
2003) (“Full payment of a tax assessment is a prerequisite to suit in federal district court; taxpayers 
may bring prepayment suits only in United States Tax Court. Without full payment of the assessment, 
the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 37. I.R.C. § 7441 (2006) (“There is hereby established, under Article I of the Constitution of the 
United States, a court of record to be known as the United States Tax Court.”). As one academic 
observed: 
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 dramatically and significantly changed the nature of the Tax 
Court . . . . [It] changed the classification . . . from an agency of the executive . . . to a 
specialized legislative court under Article I of the United States Constitution. This . . . made 
the Tax Court an independent tribunal that was (and is) separate and distinct from the IRS.  
David Laro, Panel Discussion: The Evolution of the Tax Court As An Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 17, 22 (1995). 
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judges appointed for a term of fifteen years.
38
 The court has its 
headquarters in Washington D.C., but hears cases in cities across the 
country.
39
 Often, only one judge hears cases
40
 and, unlike Article III 
courts, there is no possibility of having a jury hear the case in Tax Court.
41
 
Thus, although which court hears the case is the taxpayer’s “choice,” over 
ninety-five percent of tax cases are heard by a judge in the United States 
Tax Court because the financial incentive is so strong.
42
 
C. An International Issue: Transfer Pricing Plagues Many Nations 
The United States is certainly not the only country to struggle in its 
fight against tax avoidance through transfer pricing.
43
 Many nations 
struggle with taxing international business transactions. The thirty-three
44
 
 
 
 38. I.R.C. § 7443(a) (2006). The judges are appointed by the President. I.R.C. § 7443(b) (2006). 
They can only be removed from office “by the President, after notice and opportunity for public 
hearing, for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.” I.R.C. 
§ 7443(f) (2006). 
 39. I.R.C. § 7445 (2006) (“The principal office of the Tax Court shall be in the District of 
Columbia, but the Tax Court or any of its divisions may sit at any place within the United States.”). In 
addition, I.R.C. § 7446 provides: 
 The times and places of the sessions of the Tax Court and of its divisions shall be 
prescribed by the chief judge with a view to securing reasonable opportunity to taxpayers to 
appear before the Tax Court or any of its divisions, with as little inconvenience and expense 
to the taxpayers as practicable.  
I.R.C. § 7446 (2006). 
 40. See I.R.C. § 7444(c) (2006) (“The chief judge may from time to time divide the Tax Court 
into divisions of one or more judges . . . .”).  
 41. Statland v. United States, 178 F.3d 465, 472–73 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1155 
(2000) (“[T]he right to a jury trial does not apply to civil actions against the United States. Our Circuit 
and others have held that there is no right to a jury trial in the tax court.” (internal citations omitted)); 
Hawkins v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1530, 1534 (2003) (“[I]t is well established that there is no 
constitutional right to a jury trial in a suit concerning Federal tax liability in the Tax Court.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 The fact that the Tax Court uses judges and not juries is important because of the effects this has 
on people considering the risks of litigation. This Note assumes that the Tax Court is a fair and 
independent body. See generally Laro, supra note 37, at 24–29. 
 42. Laro, supra note 37, at 18 (“The ability of a taxpayer to litigate in the Tax Court without a 
prior payment of tax is the primary reason many taxpayers choose to pursue a tax dispute with the IRS 
in the Tax Court.”). This incentive system has also not gone unnoticed by the court. See, e.g., Cupp v. 
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 65 T.C. 68, 86 (1975) (“[W]here a taxpayer takes advantage of the 
procedure of filing a petition in the Tax Court without payment of the tax, any deprivation of a jury 
trial is due to his own act. If a taxpayer desires a jury trial, he must pay the tax and sue for refund 
thereof.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 43. Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing the “Unsourceable”: The Cost Sharing Regulations and the 
Sourcing of Affiliated Intangible-Related Transactions, 26 VA. TAX REV. 631, 643–44 (2007) (internal 
citation omitted) (“[L]imited success [of other Western countries] came only at the grave price of 
tremendous efficiency, compliance, administrative, and litigation costs.”). 
 44. The OECD currently has thirty-four of the major trading nations as its members. List of 
OECD Members—Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC 
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other industrialized nations that are members of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), like the United 
States, also use the arm’s length standard.45 Additionally, developing 
nations that are not members of the OECD take advantage of the OECD 
guidance and utilize the arm’s length standard for taxing transactions from 
multinational enterprises.
46
 
The arm’s length standard is not, in itself, a poor standard.47 The 
problems with the arm’s length standard occur in determining how to best 
apply it.
48
 The OECD alone offers five methods of application
49
 and is still 
indecisive as to which method is preferred.
50
 The standard can quickly 
become a fact-intensive dispute where the information needed to 
determine the value of a comparable arm’s length transaction and resolve 
the dispute may not exist.
51
 
As shown with IKEA, the lack of available information from which to 
derive a “correct” price for an internal business transaction is even more 
difficult when intangible property is involved.
52
 Additionally, oftentimes 
 
 
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (“OECD”), http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3746,en_2649_ 
201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2012) (“Twenty countries originally signed the 
Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development on 14 December 1960. Since 
then fourteen countries have become members of the Organisation.”). 
 45. Caroline Silberstein, Transfer Pricing: A Challenge for Developing Countries, OECD 
OBSERVER, Dec. 2009-Jan. 2010, at 29, available at http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/ 
aid/3131/Transfer_pricing:_A_challenge_for_developing_countries.html.  
 46. Id. at 31. 
 47. Benshalom, supra note 43, at 644. 
 48. Silberstein, supra note 45, at 29–30. 
 49. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRANSFER PRICING 
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS (Aug. 18, 2010); see 
also Silberstein, supra note 45, at 29–30 (providing a brief description of the five basic methods and 
complications regarding intangibles). 
 50. Silberstein, supra note 45, at 30–31 (indicating that, as recently as 2010, the OECD 
considered endorsing different methods of applying the arm’s length standard that were previously 
considered inferior “last resort” methods). 
 51. Benshalom, supra note 43, at 643 (“[T]ransfer pricing rules have a penumbra of abuse 
possibilities.”).  
 52. See Silberstein, supra note 45, at 30 (noting that “comparables can be scarce” for 
intangibles); Benshalom, supra note 43, at 647. Benshalom stated, “Many complex affiliated 
commercial transactions involving informational products lack market comparables precisely because 
they would not be efficient in unaffiliated settings.” Id. Additionally: 
[a]ffiliated transactions related to intangible assets are difficult to appraise in accordance with 
an arm’s-length standard because of several inherent characteristics of these assets. First, 
transactions related to intangible assets often lack market comparables. Second, intangibles 
also have (1) a high-risk nature, which essentially means that their value and correlative risks 
cannot be accurately inferred from the costs incurred in their creation, and (2) an enormous 
value variation to users operating in different jurisdictions and economic environments. 
Additionally, there is no market for many information assets. Accordingly, the value of many  
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there is not a clear line between transfer pricing abuse involving tangible 
assets and abuse involving intangible assets. Intra-business licensing of 
intellectual property, such as IKEA’s three percent royalty for their 
trademark and concept, allows companies to use intangible asset costs to 
undercut taxation of tangible sales and manufacturing activities.
53
 Even for 
transactions where only intangibles are involved, it can be very difficult to 
say definitively what an objectively correct, or arm’s length, valuation 
should be.
54
  
Of course, even a discussion of disputes involving transfer pricing 
relies on the questionable assumption that the government will discover 
the issue at all. The present tax regimes—disjointed and state-specific—
offer many opportunities for multinational enterprises to shift income 
without the taxing nation ever knowing that the enterprise even had the 
opportunity to do so.  
III. PREVENTING TRANSFER PRICING THROUGH A GLOBAL TAX REGIME: 
FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
Some scholars have suggested using a global-oriented approach to 
taxation, namely, “formulary apportionment.”55 Formulary apportionment 
focuses on the worldwide net income of a business, regardless of where 
the income is earned, by taking a corporation’s worldwide income and 
subtracting its worldwide expenses.
56
 Then, using a formula comprised of 
various factors to determine each country’s share, the income is 
apportioned among the countries where the business operates. Finally, 
each country’s domestic tax rates are applied to that country’s portion of 
the income.
57
 Thus, formulary apportionment attempts to prevent a 
business from lowering its tax burden by shifting income to its companies 
in low-tax jurisdictions.
58
  
 
 
intangible assets, especially those inchoate and untested assets that are still in the process of 
formation, cannot be appreciated with precision even by [multinational enterprises’] insiders. 
Id. at 649. 
 53. Id. at 647. 
 54. There is often a lack of comparable transactions by which to make such a determination. Id. 
at 649. 
 55. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al., Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A 
Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 497 (2009).  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 11. 
 58. Id. at 10. 
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A. Successful Formulary Apportionment: Defining Key Concepts 
There are two key questions that must be answered for a system of 
formulary apportionment to work: (1) what is considered a business, and 
(2) what is the apportionment formula. This Note does not cover the 
normative discussions of what the definitions should be, but rather it 
provides a brief introduction to the issues involved to best explain 
formulary apportionment.  
The first key concept is how to define a “business.”59 Multinational 
corporations, like IKEA, are often comprised of smaller distinct legal 
entities that are connected by various financial or operational ties.
60
 To 
achieve the objectives of formulary apportionment, an optimal definition 
would balance the need for an expansive definition that prevents 
circumvention through careful corporate-structuring
61
 with a sufficiently 
specific definition that minimizes its impact on business decisions.
62
  
Second, the formula for apportioning a company’s income between 
jurisdictions needs to be defined. This formula could be based entirely on 
one factor, such as sales, or on a mixture of several factors, such as 
property, payroll, and sales, each of which could be weighted equally.
63
 
Deciding what factors to use requires a careful balancing of interests. If 
the formula includes property and payroll, it will discourage companies 
from having assets and employees in high-tax locations to avoid high 
taxes. If, however, sales revenue is the only factor, export-intensive 
jurisdictions may feel undercompensated for the use of their infrastructure, 
and current “tax-haven” countries would strongly resist the likely loss of 
revenue they would experience.
64
  
 
 
 59. “[A] difficult implementation issue in adopting [formulary apportionment] is how to define a 
unitary business. Current [I.R.C. § 482] . . . merely requires direct or indirect control among related 
parties, without even a precise definition of what control requires such as is found in other [I.R.C.] 
provisions.” Id. at 24. 
 60. For a good visual depiction of this, see Ikea’s Duthch Trick, supra note 12. 
 61. This concern represents the first side of a careful balancing act: 
While it is possible that taxpayer[s] may try to avoid taxation by using “independent” 
distributing agents for their sales, it is unlikely that they would be willing to relinquish real 
control over their marketing and distribution activities . . . . [W]e would adopt a look-through 
rule that would regard any sales made by a [multinational business] to an unrelated distributor 
as sales made into the U.S. if the distributor in fact sells the goods into the U.S. and does not 
substantially transform them before they are resold. This would prevent [the multinational 
business] from avoiding tax by selling their goods into the U.S. via unrelated “strawmen” 
who would themselves have minimal profits. 
Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 56, at 25. 
 62. See id. at 24. 
 63. Id. at 11. The use of sales as a factor is the “so called ‘Massachusetts formula.’” Id. 
 64. See id. at 34–35. 
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Since formulary apportionment requires worldwide cooperation, 
finding a workable formula for all countries and corporate interests 
involved would be undoubtedly a difficult task.
65
 
B. Benefits of Formulary Apportionment 
Notwithstanding the difficulty of defining business and an acceptable 
apportionment formula, one of the major benefits of a formulary 
apportionment would be the degree of tax sovereignty it would allow each 
country to maintain. Formulary apportionment does not dictate the tax 
rates for each country and arguably gives countries greater freedom in 
setting tax policy.
66
 Neither countries “who consider their tax systems to 
be significant, attractive features of their total business climate,” nor 
countries which place “a high priority on maintaining their social welfare 
systems” would lose the ability to implement their preferred tax policy by 
setting their own tax rates to their allocated portion of transactions from 
multinational enterprises.
67
  
Another benefit of formulary apportionment is its reduced emphasis on 
the corporate structure of a business, which reduces distortion of business 
incentives and decision-making processes in tax laws.
68
 Businesses would 
experience an increase in efficiency because the simpler system would 
reduce the need to expend resources on tax planning.
69
  
 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Under formulary apportionment, a business theoretically cannot lessen its tax burden by 
using transfer pricing to shift income to another country. Rather the company will be taxed in the 
country where the sale occurred, labor is worked, or the company’s property is located, depending 
upon the factors used in the formula. Even though a business may ultimately reap less profit from sales 
in high-tax jurisdictions, under formulary apportionment, the business does not gain by shifting those 
sales to a low-tax jurisdiction assuming the cost and sales price for the transaction are the same in each 
jurisdiction. If the company can increase sales in the low-tax jurisdiction, it has no reason not to do so 
while still selling in the higher-tax country. See id. at 14–15.  
 67. See e.g., Ring, supra note 4, at 568–69 (describing why both high-tax and low-tax EU 
countries would resist a loss of tax sovereignty). In any democratic system,  
 [t]he wishes of voters . . . influence the ideal size of government, required revenue needs, 
and the allocation of the tax burden among subgroups within society. Under [formulary 
apportionment], governments would be able to choose their own corporate tax rate based on 
their assessment of these sorts of policy goals, rather than the pressures of tax competition for 
an increasingly mobile capital income tax base.  
Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 56, at 15–16. 
 68. Formulary apportionment “does not create an artificial legal distinction among types of firms, 
and whether multinational entities are organized as subsidiaries, branches, or hybrid entities. Nor does 
[it] rely on an artificial distinction between [multinational firms] whose parent is incorporated in the 
United States and [those] whose parent is incorporated elsewhere.” Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 
56, at 14.  
 69. Id. at 16 (that “[T]here would be no need to allocate income and expenses among countries, 
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In addition, formulary apportionment would allow higher-tax nations 
like the United States to either reduce tax rates or, if the rates were left 
unchanged, increase tax revenue.
70
 Governments would also likely save 
money on enforcement costs.
71
 
C. Would Formulary Apportionment Really Solve the Problem? 
Assuming formulary apportionment could overcome any 
implementation hurdles, it is unlikely that it would end tax avoidance 
schemes. Businesses could still attempt to lower their tax burden by 
“playing” whichever formula is chosen. For example, if either payroll or 
the number of employees are one of the factors, businesses could use 
independent contractors in high-tax jurisdictions or outsource work in 
high-tax jurisdictions to other companies.
72
 Similar methods could be used 
to avoid owning property, if that is a used as a factor.
73
 Intellectual 
property presents a special problem; as its value is often subjective, it is 
easy to relocate, and it “account[s] for approximately 70% of the value of 
the top 150 U.S. companies.”74 Increasing the weight of sales as a factor 
could counteract some of the difficulties presented by intellectual 
property,
75
 but doing so would require one to overcome the challenge of 
determining how sales will be allocated to a specific county.  
 
 
resulting in [a] far lighter compliance burden for firms.”). 
 70. Id. at 19–20. 
 71. “The current [transfer pricing] regime consumes a disproportionate share of both IRS and 
private sector resources.” Id. at 16. 
 72. Roin, supra note 1, at 204–05. A hypothetical example of such a scheme might involve: 
Corporation Y hiring a third party (Corporation X) to perform manufacturing services in 
Country A using the taxpayer’s raw material and intellectual property, including 
manufacturing know-how . . . . Corporation Y [thus] has no employees in A. It may derive a 
great deal of income from the manufacturing activity, however, by virtue of playing the role 
of financier, insurer of business risks, and, of course, provider of manufacturing know-how 
and the like. U.S. taxpayers have succeeded in finding “contract manufacturers,” as 
Corporation X’s are called, willing to play their roles for very small markups over cost, 
leaving Corporation Y with the lion’s share of the resulting profits. Meanwhile, Corporation 
Y does not have a large staff to carry out its lucrative tasks, and can often locate that staff in a 
small tax haven country. 
Id. at 205–06. It may be difficult to distinguish legitimate behavior of this kind from tax-avoidance 
motivated behavior. “For example, some companies maintain in-house legal staffs, while others use 
law firms. Some carry out their own manufacturing operations, while others contract with 
organizations specializing in such operations.” Id. at 205.  
 73. “[F]acilities utilized by a third-party service provider such as a contract manufacturer would 
not be imputed back to the contracting party.” Id. at 206. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. (“[T]he exclusion of intangible property from the property factor is probably less 
distortionary than it first appears because other factors serve as an adequate proxy for such property. In 
particular, overweighting of the sales factor may do a reasonably good job of apportioning the income 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss4/6
  
 
 
 
 
2011] DETERRING TRANSFER PRICING ABUSE 829 
 
 
 
 
Generally, “sales of tangible property are attributed to the state to 
which such property is shipped or in which it is delivered.”76 Businesses 
can frustrate such a system, however, by setting up “strawmen” to 
complete sales in low-tax jurisdictions.
77
 Some jurisdictions have tried to 
fight this practice by adopting tests that apportion a sale to the place where 
the good ends up after all transportation is completed, but such a standard 
generally “introduc[es] ‘time-consuming and burdensome 
complexities.’”78 Sales of services involving international businesses are 
also often difficult to assign to a specific location.
79
  
In summary, the practical problems associated with implementing 
formulary apportionment have prevented its adoption. The challenges have 
thus far outweighed the foreseeably attainable benefits of minimizing 
transfer pricing, which as discussed, may be obtained in part with other tax 
avoidance procedures. Until a global tax system is adopted, nations will 
benefit by improving their ability to detect transfer pricing and vigorously 
collecting the taxes due on income fairly attributable to their jurisdiction. 
IV. DETERRING TRANSFER PRICING BY MODIFYING NATIONAL TAX 
REGIMES: THE UNITED STATES LAWS AS AN EXAMPLE 
A. Influencing Taxpayer Behavior 
A taxpayer’s willingness to engage in transactions which are neither 
clearly legal nor illegal depends on (1) the business’s ex ante assessment 
of its probabilities of being audited; (2) the probability that, if audited, the 
audit will find the business’s tax position is illegal; and (3) the magnitude 
of the penalties which would be imposed after an unfavorable audit 
result.
80
 Generally, taxpayers do not know their probability of being 
 
 
derived from those intellectual property rights generating benefits in the country of use or purchase, 
such as patents, copyrights, and marketing intangibles.”). 
 76. Id. at 207. 
 77. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a strawman as “[a] third party used in some transactions as a 
temporary transferee to allow the principal parties to accomplish something that is otherwise 
impermissible.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  
 78. Roin, supra note 1, at 207–08. 
 79. See id. at 208–09. One academic noted: 
To a very large extent, the place-of-service test merely replicates the payroll factor and often 
results in little or no allocation to the market state . . . . One could look to the address of the 
purchaser, but as is the case with tangible goods, there is no guarantee that the immediate 
purchaser is anything other than a middleman for some other, ultimate user. 
Id. 
 80. See Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law is Uncertain, 27 
VA. TAX REV. 241, 245 (2007). 
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audited because the IRS keeps secret the details of how it selects which 
taxpayers to audit.
81
 It is also difficult for businesses to predict the 
probability that a tax position will be found illegal, for if these predictions 
were easy, then the transaction would be clearly legal or illegal, based on 
the prediction. Although it is difficult to accurately predict the probability 
that the IRS will deem a tax position illegal, a taxpayer can predict quite 
accurately any penalties that may apply. 
Under the U.S. tax code, taxpayers who understate their tax liability are 
generally subject to a twenty-percent penalty on the portion the taxpayer 
failed to pay.
82
 In cases involving fraudulent underpayment of tax, the 
penalties more than triple,
83
 but this Note assumes that taxpayers are 
attempting to reduce their tax burden legally. The difference in the 
penalties shows that Congress understands that uncertainty in the tax laws 
might cause a taxpayer to underpay without having any intent to defraud 
the IRS. Were Congress indifferent to the reason the tax was not paid, the 
penalties would be the same. With the current penalty structure, however, 
it appears that Congress is trying to achieve a balance between punishing 
taxpayers and encouraging them to take more aggressive tax positions.  
In theory, Congress could mathematically determine the optimal 
penalty to deter the underpayment of tax. This mathematical determination 
is referred to as the “Bentham-Becker penalty [and] is calculated by 
dividing the harm caused by the probability of detection.”84 The harm in 
 
 
 81. Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
1017, 1070–71 (2009). There are some techniques, however, a taxpayer could use to get a better idea 
of the probability of an audit. “The IRS scores individual returns using its Discriminant Index Function 
(DIF). Any return that scores above a certain numerical threshold is reviewed ‘by hand’—that is, by an 
individual human auditor who decides, based on her review of the return, whether the taxpayer will be 
audited.” Id. at 1068–69. With this knowledge: 
[i]n theory . . . taxpayers could figure out a fairly good approximation of the Discriminant 
Index Function by pooling years of their tax return information and audits and running a 
regression analysis to figure out how the IRS was selecting returns to audit—that is, what 
items on a tax return increased chances of an audit, in what combination, and by how much. 
Id. at 1070. 
 82. I.R.C. § 6662(a) (2006). 
 83. I.R.C. § 6663(a) (2006)  (emphasis added) (“If any part of any underpayment of tax required 
to be shown on a return is due to fraud, there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 75 percent of 
the portion of the underpayment which is attributable to fraud.”). 
 84. Logue, supra note 80, at 266. 
The theory is that such a penalty makes the expected value of the fine equal the harm. Thus in 
general, so long as (1) the ex post adjudicator can accurately determine both the ex ante 
probability of detection and the amount of the harm . . . (2) taxpayers or their advisors are 
aware of this fact, and (3) taxpayers have sufficient assets at risk to care about [a] large ex 
post penalty, then the use of such an ex post penalty regime can create the proper ex ante tax  
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this context is the underpayment amount of the tax. The probability of 
detection is the chance that a taxpayer would be both (1) selected for an 
audit, and (2) found to have taken an incorrect tax position. A 
mathematically optimal penalty would cause a taxpayer to act as if the 
probability of detection were equal to one.
85
 Since the actual probability of 
detection is quite small,
86
 any such penalty would need to be quite large to 
produce the desired counter-incentive. Therein lies the problem. If the 
underpayment of tax is $100 and there is a 1% probability of detection, 
then the theoretically appropriate fine is $10,000.
87
 Although 
mathematically correct, such a large fine is unlikely to be politically and 
practically feasible.
88
 Thus, although Congress can, and does, use 
monetary penalties to deter behavior, it is limited in the extent to which it 
can use them to achieve the desired effect. 
B. Risk Versus Uncertainty 
The remaining avenue through which to affect taxpayer behavior is to 
alter the probability of detection. It is not the actual probability of 
detection that counts in this regard, but the taxpayer’s subjective ex ante 
 
 
compliance incentives. Indeed, under such a regime, people should behave as if the 
probability of detection were equal to one and the fine equaled the harm. 
Id. at 266–67. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 264–65. 
According to the most recent Service statistics, the 2005 audit rates were as follows: all 
individuals (0.9%); individuals with under $25,000 of income (1.5%); individuals with under 
$100,000 of income (0.8%); corporations with assets over $10 million (20%); corporations 
with assets over $250 million (44%); corporations with assets under $10 million (0.8%) . . . . 
Based on research from data from earlier years, it appears that, of those taxpayers who are 
audited, only a small percentage (as low as 4%) are actually penalized . . . . [A]udit rates for 
individuals are much higher for certain types of errors, such as omitting income that is 
reported on information returns. 
Id. at 264–65 n.47 (citations omitted). 
 87. Id. at 266. 
 88. The public would likely consider the fine to be disproportionate to the harm. Id. at 268. 
Calculating penalties in this manner might also be considered inequitable because it would give greater 
punishment to less aggressive tax positions and lesser punishment to more aggressive tax positions. 
The IRS naturally focuses more on aggressive tax positions, but this increases the likelihood of 
detection, which, in theory, means that the penalty does not need to be as high. Conversely, since the 
IRS places less focus on less aggressive tax positions, thereby lowering the probability of detection, 
were one of them to nevertheless be found illegal, the theoretically appropriate penalty would have to 
be quite high. Id. at 268–69. An additional complication is that “a rational taxpayer . . . would ignore 
the threat of any ex post fine that exceeds the amount of her assets that are available to satisfy a tax 
judgment. This fact . . . limits the ability of large ex post fines to produce optimal ex ante compliance 
incentives.” Id. at 269. 
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assessment of its ex post probability of detection.
89
 This assessment is not 
a pure calculation of risk, but rather it is a guess of the likelihood that a 
possible future event will actually come to pass.
90
  
There is an important difference between purely calculating risk and 
making a guess in an attempt to make something certain that is actually 
uncertain. Understanding this difference is important for recognizing how 
one can influence taxpayer behavior in this context. Risk refers to a known 
probability of occurrence which, given enough repetitions of an event, will 
eventually emerge.
91
 A guess in the face of uncertainty operates 
differently. It is not a statement regarding a trend that will emerge, but 
rather a “reflect[ion of] the strength of the speaker’s belief that the event 
will happen . . . .”92 Since taxpayers’ beliefs, as opposed to personal 
knowledge or calculations, are the basis for their decisions, it is possible to 
use their beliefs, even if incorrect, as a tool to modify their behavior. The 
degree of uncertainty itself may also be used to work a change in taxpayer 
behavior. “If, as empirical work suggests, some taxpayers have an 
aversion to uncertainty, the uncertainty associated with whether certain 
questionable transactions are permitted . . . may itself reduce the number 
of taxpayers who engage in those transactions.”93  
 
 
 89. Lawsky, supra note 81, at 1044. 
 90. See id. at 1034–35, 1042–43. 
 91. “This sort of interpretation of a statement of probability . . . is a frequentist interpretation. In 
other words, a frequentist interpretation of the statement ‘The probability of the event is X%’ is ‘Over 
the long run, the ratio of occurrences to total events will converge on X%.’” Id. at 1027. 
 92. Id. at 1029. Lawsky articulated: 
Someone might say during football season, “The Giants have a 75% chance of winning their 
next game.” . . . Does this person mean that, over the long run, the Giants will win 75% of 
their games—that their winning percentage over time will converge on 75%? That does not 
seem right. Maybe next year the Giants will have a terrible team, and for the next twenty 
years after that they will win only one game a season . . . . Perhaps, then, the person means 
that the Giants have won three out of four games “just like this one.” What does it mean, 
though, for a game to be “just like this one”? This question raises two related problems. First, 
this is a nonrepeatable event: the Giants playing next week’s opponents under these precise 
circumstances will happen only once. Second, we have a reference class problem: What 
group of games should we look at to determine how many times the event “Giants win” 
occurs? . . . Away games? Games against this opponent? Away games against this opponent? 
. . . As we make the description of the reference class more specific, we are in some ways 
gaining information . . . . On the other hand, we are also narrowing the class until we have no 
other games to which to compare this game, because this particular game is a nonrepeatable 
event. 
Id. at 1027–28. Likewise, a taxpayer would face a similar problem in trying to determine the 
“probability of detection,” as it is used in the tax context.  
 93. Id. at 1046. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss4/6
  
 
 
 
 
2011] DETERRING TRANSFER PRICING ABUSE 833 
 
 
 
 
C. Using Uncertainty to Decrease Transfer Pricing Abuse  
Given the behavioral characteristics of people facing uncertainty, an 
optimal change to the transfer pricing tax laws would (1) take advantage of 
a commonly held belief, (2) increase uncertainty, and yet (3) not diminish 
fact-finding accuracy. Stripping the U.S. Tax Court of its jurisdiction in 
transfer pricing cases and forcing the disputes into Article III courts would 
have this effect. The possibility of transfer pricing cases going to a jury 
would significantly alter multinational companies’ assessment of such 
cases.  
First, this change would take advantage of the general perception that 
juries are less predictable in their decisions than judges.
94
 Juries are 
perceived, among other things, to be led astray easily, unable to 
understand or follow complex trials, and unable to understand a judge’s 
instructions on the law and how facts should be applied to that law.
95
 
Judges, on the other hand, are seen as “better educated, more 
sophisticated, and less susceptible to attorney suasion.”96 Companies 
would likely perceive the possibility of a jury deciding a fact-intensive 
transfer pricing case as increasing the uncertainty of the decision on 
legality greater than the uncertainty when the judge acts as the fact-finder. 
Many studies have been conducted on jury accuracy, and these studies 
have generally found that juries are not less accurate than judges.
97
 A 
study conducted through the University of Chicago found that judges 
agreed with a jury’s assessment of liability more than seventy-five percent 
of the time, and the times they disagreed were evenly split between 
plaintiffs and defendants.
98
 Even when the judges disagreed with a jury’s 
decision, they usually agreed that the jury’s decision was reasonable.99 In 
addition, several studies refute the perception that juries are easily 
confused or fooled by expert witnesses
100
 or are likely uneducated.
101
 
 
 
 94. See Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 
ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 849–50 (1998). 
 95. See id. 
 96. Id. at 850. 
 97. See HARRY KALVEN JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63–65 (1966). 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. at 54–57, 104–08; Vidmar, supra note 94, at 849–50. 
 100. Vidmar, supra note 94, at 863–64 (“[S]tudies also lend little support to the claim of juror 
gullibility.”). 
 101. “A review of data from the 2000 United States Census indicates that there is a sizeable 
percentage of highly educated people in at least twenty of the nation’s most populous and most 
litigious counties.” Richard C. Waites & David A. Giles, Are Jurors Equipped to Decide the Outcome 
of Complex Cases?, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 19, 29 (2005). Of course, if the highly educated people 
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Thus, by forcing transfer pricing cases into Article III courts where a 
jury trial is possible, the system can maintain accuracy of its decisions 
while gaining a degree of perceived unpredictability. This perceived 
unpredictability will likely lead to a reduction in the aggressive use of 
transfer pricing for tax avoidance. Corporate decision-makers will feel 
there is a greater need to avoid risky behavior because of the perceived 
higher degree of uncertainty associated with the possibility of later facing 
a jury. Moreover, removing transfer pricing cases from the U.S. Tax 
Court’s jurisdiction also creates a financial incentive to avoid aggressive 
transfer pricing schemes, and perhaps the concomitant increased risk of 
IRS scrutiny, because businesses would not be able to delay paying the tax 
at issue. Forcing businesses to pay first and litigate later would make them 
consider the time value of the money in question, which may be 
significant given the length of time needed for a full jury trial. This 
approach may help deter aggressive use of transfer pricing schemes.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Tax avoidance by multinational enterprises is serious and growing 
problem. While the goal of anti-tax-avoidance legislation is relatively 
simple to understand and stated in broad terms, actually implementing a 
system to carry out these goals has proven extremely difficult. The 
adoption of a global tax system to overcome the difficulties associated 
with each country trying to resolve the issue independently does not 
appear to be a viable solution. In the United States, businesses are able to 
choose a forum for tax disputes where they do not have to pay the disputed 
tax up front and are guaranteed that they will not face a jury. This system 
supports multinational enterprises’ willingness to engage in aggressive 
transfer pricing schemes. Stripping the U.S. Tax Court of its jurisdiction in 
transfer pricing cases would force businesses into a forum where the 
disputed tax must be paid up front and the government would be able to 
insist that a jury serve as the fact-finder. This change would reverse the 
 
 
are not the people serving on juries, then their presence in the community at large would not be of any 
help to accuracy in the courtroom. Thus, 
[b]ecause of previous legal complaints about the demographics of a given jury pool, federal 
and state court clerks are sensitive to the issue. They have instituted enhancements in their 
jury selection procedures that should result in a healthy combination of jurors of all 
intellectual and educational levels. 
Id. at 30. But see id. at 26 (“One example of the confusion being experienced by federal courts is the 
question about whether there should be a ‘complexity exception’ that would carve out complex cases 
that would otherwise be subject to the requirements of a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.”). 
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financial incentive built into the current system in the United States and 
decrease businesses’ willingness to use aggressive transfer pricing tactics 
to shift income to lower-tax jurisdictions. While obviously not a complete 
solution to the underlying problem, stripping the U.S. Tax Court of 
jurisdiction in transfer pricing cases would be a small step in the right 
direction.  
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